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NO HARM, NO FOUL: ABORTION AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF FETAL INNOCENCE 
Kenneth Einar Himma 
Christianity is generally thought to entail a pro-life position on abortion 
rights. Since the fetus is a person, on this view, from the moment of con-
ception, abortion is murder and hence should be legally prohibited. In this 
essay, I will concede for the sake of argument the claims that the fetus is a 
person and that abortion is murder, but I will argue that a Christian can 
coherently hold that abortion should be legally permitted anyway. The 
argument will principally be based on claims regarding the ultimate fate of 
moral innocents and certain commonly accepted liberal views on the 
boundaries of morally legitimate lawmaking authority. 
It is commonly taken for granted that some set of tenets central to 
Christianity entails what I will call the Conservative View of Abortion. 
The essentials of this view are well known, so I will describe them only 
briefly. According to the Conservative View, personhood begins at the 
moment of conception'; conception, then, is the event that brings a new 
person into the world - though its existence will obviously depend in a 
very intimate way on its mother for a period of nine months. Since the 
fetus is a person from the moment of conception, it has a right to life from 
that moment on that is violated by abortion. Abortion, thus, constitutes 
murder in violation of the Sixth Commandment and is hence always a sin. 
The Conservative View, however, is not limited to taking a position on 
the morality or sinfulness of abortion; it also involves a political position 
with respect to what the law on abortion should be. This part of the view 
is not always made explicit, but I take it that the essentials are as follows. 
No state can be legitimate unless it protects innocent persons from griev-
ous harm. Since the state is therefore morally obligated to prohibit the 
intentional killing of innocent persons and abortion always involves the 
intentional killing of an innocent person, it follows that the state is obligat-
ed to prohibit abortion. 
In this essay, I attempt to construct an alternative to the Conservative 
View. My efforts, however, will not require challenging the assumption 
that the fetus is a person at the moment of conception. Indeed, I will 
assume that this is true and hence that abortion is always murder, but 
argue that a Christian can coherently hold that it should be permitted any-
way.2 The argument will principally be based on claims regarding the ulti-
mate fate of moral innocents and certain commonly accepted liberal views 
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on the boundaries of morally legitimate lawmaking authority. 
The analysis is intended not as a refutation of the Conservative View, 
but as an attempt to construct a coherent liberal position on abortion out of 
materials that are available to Christians. As an empirical matter, of 
course, conservative Christians will likely reject some of these premises. 
But, again, the point here is only to build a coherent pro-choice position on 
the strength of religious, moral, and political doctrines that are still in play 
among Christians. Thus, while I think the analysis here puts a difficult 
question to the Conservative View, the reader who is expecting an attempt 
to refute that view will be disappointed. 
1. The Noncoincidellce Thesis 
I begin with a thesis that I assume (and hope) is uncontroversial among 
Christians: 
The Noncoincidence Thesis: There are sins that cannot legitimately 
be prohibited by the state. 
The Noncoincidence Thesis, then, simply asserts that it is morally imper-
missible for the state to criminalize every sin. Insofar as the 
Noncoincidence Thesis denies that the state has unlimited authority to pro-
hibit and punish what is morally objectionable, it is a moral thesis about 
the limits of the legitimate use of the state's coercive power. 
A cursory inspection of the Ten Commandments discloses a number of 
sins that are not legitimately restricted by the law and thus confirms the 
plausibility of the Noncoincidence Thesis. For example, it would clearly be 
illegitimate to criminalize the coveting of another person's goods or 
spouse. One obvious problem with such a prohibition is that, in the vast 
majority of instances, it is impossible to verify that a coveting has taken 
place with sufficient reliability to warrant the application of coercive force. 
Since, as a conceptual matter, a mere mental state is sufficient to constitute 
an instance of coveting and since we lack direct access to the mental states 
of others, there would be insurmountable epistemic difficulties involved in 
enforcing such a prohibition. 
There is another more serious difficulty. Even if we had an infallible 
mind-reading device that could ethically be used, it would still be morally 
problematic for the state to prohibit coveting. It is reasonable to think that 
the state's coercive force may not legitimately be used to prohibit purely 
private mental events. Believing something or feeling something may be 
sinful, but it is not the proper business of the law to enforce the instantia-
tion or non-instantiation of any particular mental state. The law is proper-
ly concerned with outward behaviors and not inner events; it is the 
province of God, and not the province of the law, to judge the contents of a 
person's mind in the absence of some outward behavioral manifestation. 
It is also uncontrovcrsial, I think, that not every sinful outward behavior 
can legitimately be prohibited. The state, for example, has no business 
making it a crime to dishonor one's parents. Dishonoring a person is just 
not the sort of behavior the state can legitimately prohibit - at least in the 
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absence of some substantial injury to economic or reputational interests, 
such as occurs when one person slanders another. While some instances of 
dishonorings may involve these types of injury, the sort that is more com-
mon to the familial context involves a comparatively private insult that 
does not culminate in economic or reputational injury. Put that together 
with the view that the familial context deserves some insulation from state 
regulation and we have a cogent argument for thinking the state should 
not coercively enforce the Fifth Commandment. 
Likewise, it would be illegitimate for the state to institutionalize either 
the First Commandment by prohibiting other religions than Christianity or 
the Fourth Commandment by prohibiting work on Sundays. Of course, 
one might reasonably take issue with the extent of the separation between 
church and state that has been read into the First Amendment's 
Establishment Clause by the Supreme Court. Even so, the principle that 
fallible human authorities ought generally to allow people to worship as 
they see fit is an obvious constraint on legitimate lawmaking authority. 
There is, I hope, nothing controversial about any of this. While most 
Christians would probably like to see the state do more in the way of 
enforcing morality, all but the most radically conservative would concede 
that there are substantive limits on the state's authority to coercively 
enforce Christian moral and theological commitments. Most, I trust, 
would accept the analysis of the examples given above. But, in any event, 
this much should be clear: there is nothing in the central tenets of 
Christianity that precludes acceptance of the Noncoincidence Thesis. 
Accordingly, Christians are free to adopt the Noncoincidence Thesis. 
II. The Harm-to-Others and Offense Principles 
Assuming the Noncoincidence Thesis is correct, the next issue is to deter-
mine the boundaries of legitimate lawmaking authority. Since the 
Noncoincidence Thesis merely asserts that not every sin can legitimately be 
criminaIized, it tells us very little about how the state may legitimately 
exercise its lawmaking function and hence about whether abortion may 
legitimately be prohibited. What we need, then, is a theory of morallegiti-
macy that distinguishes those sins that are legitimately criminalized from 
those sins that are not. 
The liberal tradition includes a number of different principles of moral 
legitimacy that ultimately derive from the view that the state should 
respect citizen autonomy. Some of these are, of course, procedural. Most, 
if not all, liberal political theorists view democratic procedural constraints 
as a necessary condition for moral legitimacy. On this familiar view, law-
making authority is legitimate only to the extent that the lawmakers can 
fairly be characterized as representing the interests of the people as a 
whole. And this can occur only in a system where the lawmakers are 
either the people themselves or are elected by the people in fair elections. 
Put roughly, then, the underlying idea is that democratic procedures are 
morally ideal only insofar as they respect the autonomy of citizens by 
allowing them to participate in lawmaking activities and thereby to govern 
themselves. 
ABORTION AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF FETAL INNOCENCE 175 
But the liberal tradition also claims there are substantive limits to what 
can legitimately be enacted into law by democratic processes. A regime is 
no less totalitarian just because it is democratic. A system of laws that rec-
ognizes no limits on what can be required or prohibited by law is a totali-
tarian system - regardless of how such laws come into being. For example, 
a norm that prohibits religious worship or bars women from the work 
force is illegitimate even if it is enacted into law by democratic processes. 
On this plausible view, which underlies the substantive protections of both 
the United States Constitution and the Canadian Charter, there are limits 
on the extent to which a democratic majority may legitimately restrict the 
freedom of dissenting individuals.} 
Ultimately underlying this view, as was true of the commitment to 
democratic procedures, is a commitment to the moral importance of auton-
omy. Every law operates to restrict the behavior of some class of human 
beings in some way and hence tends to undermine human autonomy. 
Accordingly, every law involves some moral disvalue insofar as it under-
mines human autonomy. Indeed, it is for this very reason that anarchists 
believe that the exercise of authority over any subject is necessarily incon-
sistent with respect for the subject's autonomy and must hence be morally 
illegitimate.4 
Classical liberals, of course, reject the anarchist's claim that all authority 
is illegitimate, but recognize, as they must, the tension between coercive 
authority and autonomy, which provides the impetus for philosophical 
theorizing about political legitimacy. There are a number of different 
strategies for resolving the apparent tension between the two, but the one 
that is relevant for our purposes attempts to identify a greater moral good 
that outweighs the moral cost of restricting autonomy. 
The most famous instance of this strategy presupposes that the moral 
importance of public health and safety outweigh the moral cost of restrict-
ing autonomy. According to John Stuart Mill's Harm Principle, a behavior 
can legitimately be restricted only insofar as such a restriction is instru-
mental to preventing harm to third parties: 
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or col-
lectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their num-
ber, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.5 
As a utilitarian, Mill must ground his views on the limits of legitimate law-
making authority in an analysis of the effects of coercively restricting 
autonomy on human well being. Accordingly, if the promotion of health 
and safety justifies restricting autonomy, it must be because health and 
safety are more vital to well being than respect for autonomy - a position 
that may seem unintuitive in a culture that seems to privilege speech over 
all other values, but is eminently sensible. 
It is worth noting that there are two different thoughts in the passage 
cited above; and while Mill apparently believes otherwise, they are not log-
ically equivalent. The first is that legal restrictions on the behavior of other 
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people can be justified only in terms of self-protection; the second is that 
such justifications must make reference to the prevention of harm to oth-
ers. While the second entails the first, the converse does not hold - at least 
not if "harm" is construed in the ordinary sense. For the interest in self-
protection might not be limited to the interest in protection from harm as 
Mill conceives it. Although Mill probably intends his Harm Principle as 
concerned exclusively with physical and economic harm, there are other 
sorts of threat that might justify coercive precautions. 
Joel Feinberg, for example, argues for the Offense Principle, according to 
which behavior may legitimately be restricted to avoid offense to others. 
Feinberg describes the Offense Principle as follows: 
It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibi-
tion that it would probably be an effective way of preventing serious 
offense (as opposed to injury or harm) to persons other than the 
actor, and that it is probably a necessary means to that end (i.e., there 
is probably no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost 
to other values). The principle asserts, in effect, that the prevention of 
offensive conduct is properly the state's business.6 
Like the Harm Principle, the Offense Principle rationalizes legal restriction 
of freedom as a form of self-protection. On this view, legal restrictions on 
behavior can be justified as a means of preventing" any or all of a miscel-
lany of disliked mental states (disgust, shame, hurt, anxiety, etc.)" resulting 
from the conduct of others.' Thus, for example, the Offense Principle justi-
fies the prohibition of public nudity on the ground that such behavior is 
likely to cause offense to third parties. 
The claim that the Harm and Offense Principles exhaust the substantive 
limits of legitimate lawmaking authority comprises what I will call the 
Protection Thesis.' Though the Protection Thesis is often thought of as 
being a modern view, it has been around for many centuries and has been 
accepted by many Christian thinkers. For example, Peter Abelard held 
that "all sins are of the mind only," but nonetheless argued that punish-
ment should be reserved for outward manifestations of culpable mental 
states that result in harm: 
Injury to the soul we do not regard as so much a matter for punish-
ment as injury to others. Our object is to avoid public mischief, rather 
than to correct personal mistakes.... Everything which is likely to 
lead to common loss or to public harm must be punished by a greater 
requital. Where a sin involves more serious injury the penalty must 
therefore be heavier. The greater the social stumbling-block, the 
more stringent must be the social correction, even though the original 
guilt be relatively lighU 
This passage indicates Abelard accepts both of the two premises I have 
argued for up until now. Given that sins resulting in no common loss or 
public harm should not be punished, as the passage above indicates, it fol-
lows that, on Abelard's view, not every sin should be punished; thus, 
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Abelard clearly accepts the Noncoincidence Thesis. Second, given that 
"injury to others" is the test of whether a behavior should be punished 
(and hence prohibited by a criminal law), it follows that Abelard accepts 
the Protection Thesis. 
Like Mill, then, Abelard appears to view the function of law as public 
protection, leaving the judgment of sin to God. As Abelard puts the point: 
We reserve, therefore, sins of the soul for the divine judgment.. .. The 
degree of contempt displayed by men to God is afterwards propor-
tionately punished, whatever be their condition or calling.... It is the 
soul in its scheme of intention, not in the outward result of its action, 
that God assesses. III 
Thus, whereas human beings may punish publicly harmful manifestations 
of inward sinful states, it is the province of God to judge a person's moral 
character. 
There are, of course, difficulties associated with the Protection Thesis. In 
particular, it is not immediately clear how to articulate a coherent set of 
principles that distinguishes those harms and offenses that justify restrict-
ing freedom from those that do not justify restricting freedom. But this is 
just a specific instance of a general problem that afflicts most attempts to 
make some moral principle precise and hence should not be considered a 
fatal objection against the Protection Thesis. 
In any event, my point here is to describe, in admittedly rough terms, a 
particular account of legitimacy that can viably be held by Christians - and 
not to defend it. Given that the Protection Thesis coheres well with exist-
ing constitutional practice, it is a plausible position. Given that there is 
nothing in the central doctrines of Christianity that precludes accepting the 
Protection Thesis, it is open to a Christian to accept it - as many have. 
Thus, the claim that the Harm and Offense Principles exhaust the substan-
tive moral limits on democratic lawmaking authority remains a viabJe 
position for Christians. 
TlI. The Doctrine of Juvenile Innocence 
As it turns out, it is surprisingly difficult for a wholly secularist approach 
to justify a legal prohibition of killing under the Protection Thesis in a way 
that harmonizes with our intuitions. If what justifies a law restricting 
killing is the harm it causes to the victim, it is difficult to see why the law 
should regard intentional killing as presumptively wrong. For if the killing 
is administered in a painless way, something that is easy enough to accom-
plish, it can plausibly be argued that the victim has not incurred any harm. 
First, if, as some philosophers believe, harm cannot exist without being 
experienced in some way," the secularist seems committed to claiming that 
the victim of a painless killing sustains no harm - either during or after the 
killing. Second, if, as other philosophers believe, harm must be instantiat-
ed by a living subject,12 the victim's premature death does not constitute a 
harm; for the victim is no longer the sort of entity that can instantiate 
harm. 13 
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This, of course, is not to deny that there will nearly always be harmful 
third-party effects resulting from a killing. A murder victim is likely to 
have friends and relatives who sustain considerable pain as a result of the 
crime. Obviously, the loss of a friend produces considerable mental suffer-
ing to other persons in the form of grief. Less obviously, the loss of a friend 
may have the effect of making one painfully aware of one's vulnerability-
an effect that is exacerbated when the friend's death results from a violent 
crime. 
But the idea that a law criminalizing murder must be justified entirely 
on the strength of these sorts of third-party effects does not do justice to 
our intuitions about why intentional killing should be prohibited in cir-
cumstances not involving defense against a culpable threat to life. First, of 
course, whether a killing results in third-party effects will depend on the 
contingent circumstances of the victim. A killing will not cause apprecia-
ble third-party harm if the victim lacks friends and relatives, but the 
absence of third party effects surely would not justify permitting a murder. 
Second, and more importantly, a theory that justifies legally prohibiting 
murder entirely in terms of third-party effects cannot make sense of the 
idea that what justifies such laws is the harm that murder causes to the vic-
tim. While, as a practical matter, third-party effects will justify prohibiting 
the vast majority of intentional killings, reference to third-party effects can-
not explain our strong intuition that intentional killing should generally be 
prohibited to protect potential victims.14 
Here the Christian theorist has access to resources that the secularist 
lacks. Unlike the secularist attracted to the Protection Thesis, the Christian 
can argue that the killing of a moral person always, indeed necessarily, 
involves a substantial harm to the victim. On this line of reasoning, killing 
a moral person necessarily results in harm by subjecting her to the risk of 
being judged by God before she has fully accepted the essential Christian 
doctrines. Whether one interprets hell literally as involving the subjection 
of the soul or resurrected body to unending torment or whether one 
instead interprets hell as involving an eternal separation from God, there is 
no greater harm, according to Christianity, to which one can be subjected. IS 
And it is important to realize that the justification for legally prohibiting 
murder under the Protection Thesis does not depend on the outcome of 
God's judgment. It is no defense for a drunk driver to say "Well, I didn't 
hurt anyone; so I shouldn't be punished." While it might be true that the 
drunk driver did not hit anyone, it is also true that she might have. 
Likewise, it is no defense for her to say "Well, she went to heaven anyway; 
so there are no grounds to blame or punish me" - even assuming a mur-
derer could know this about his victim. While it might be true that the vic-
tim does not wind up in hell, it is also true that she might have. The 
Protection Thesis, as it is most plausibly construed, justifies the legal 
restriction of any behavior that subjects third parties to an unreasonable 
risk of harm. 
Thus, while it is difficult to make a secularist argument linking the 
Harm and Offense Principles, which exhaust the limits of legitimate law-
making authority under the Protection Thesis, with a general prohibition 
on killing in a way that harmonizes with our intuitions, no such difficulty 
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exists for the Christian philosopher. Intentional killing should be prohibit-
ed in nearly every circumstance because it necessarily subjects the victim to 
a risk of the gravest harm of all- the risk of eternal damnation. And that is 
a harm that is rightly protected against by the state. 
IV. Fetal Innocence and Abortion Law 
It turns out, however, that the view that killing necessarily subjects the vic-
tim to the risk of eternal damnation is subject to one important class of 
exceptions. Insofar as culpability presupposes moral know ledge, someone 
who lacks moral knowledge through no fault of her own is incapable of cul-
pability and is hence exempt from divine punishment. Thus, for example, 
someone who instantiates a severe cognitive disability is saved without 
regard to either her behavior or her attitude towards Christian doctrine. 
Such a person is saved no matter how she behaves or what she believes. 
The same is true of children before they have developed the capacity for 
moral reasoning. Such persons are incapable of culpability in either deed 
or belief and, as Abelard puts the point, "are saved without merit of their 
own, as for instance, infants, and attain eternal life by grace alone."lh 
Accordingly, under the assumption that fetuses are persons at the moment 
of conception and are hence the bearers of moral rights (though obviously 
not of moral obligations), it follows that fetuses that die before birth are, as 
a matter of moral necessity, saved without regard to personal merit. 
One might nonetheless be tempted to think that premature death results 
in some harm to the fetus. After all, premature death results in the loss of a 
worldly life that admittedly has its charms: family, community, romantic 
and sexual love, art, sport, and knowledge are all among the goods that 
make life worth living. Indeed, Don Marquis argues that what makes 
abortion wrong is that it deprives the fetus of exactly these sorts of goods: 
[T]he misfortune of premature death consists of the loss to us of the 
future goods of consciousness. What are those goods? Much can be 
said about this issue, but a simple answer will do for the purposes of 
this essay. The goods of life are whatever we get out of life. The 
goods of life are those items toward which we take a pro attitude. 
They are completed projects of which we are proud, the pursuit of 
our goals, aesthetic enjoyments, friendships, intellectual pursuits, and 
physical pleasures of various sorts. The goods of life are what make 
life worth living.17 
Thus, Marquis concludes, what makes abortion wrong is that it deprives 
the fetus of "a future like ours" - regardless of whether the fetus is a moral 
person. 
Intriguingly, there is a sense in which the Christian theorist is in a better 
position than the secularist to take advantage of this sort of strategy. As a 
practical matter, secularist philosophers are considerably less likely than 
Christian philosophers to hold a form of substance dualism. To the extent 
that a Christian accepts the existence of souls that survive the death of the 
body, she can straightforwardly attribute a harm to the fetus's soul that 
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results from premature death. Thus, whereas the secularist runs into trou-
ble trying to identify a locus for the harm that is caused by death, the 
Christian encounters no difficulty on this score: the locus of the harm is the 
persisting soul of the prematurely deceased fetus. 
Although Christianity's commitment to substance dualism makes possi-
ble such a line of argument, it is nonetheless untenable. The powerful 
response to the argument recalls Pascal's famous reasoning. Since the 
rewards a worldly life offers are always finite, it follows that the harm that 
results from being deprived of such a life is also finite. On the other hand, 
the benefit of what is essentially a free pass to heaven is infinite. 
Accordingly, whatever harm results from a premature death under such 
circumstances is infinitely outweighed by the benefit that results from an 
immediate and infinite salvation. 
Indeed, it can plausibly be argued that premature death conduces maxi-
mally to the fetus's self-interest. To see this, imagine yourself in the follow-
ing sihlation. While in the womb, you are temporarily made fully rational 
and offered the choice between a premature death and an opportunity to 
live a worldly life. The choice is expressed as follows. Should you choose a 
premature death, you will immediately experience a profound and eternal 
bliss - an ecstasy beyond any possible in this world. Should you choose an 
opportunity to live a worldly life, you will be judged at the end of your life 
for your deeds and beliefs. If you are judged favorably, you gain eternal 
bliss; if not, you will suffer eternal torment. You are also told there are 
many temptations that may lead you down a path that culminates in an 
unfavorable judgment so that the risk of such torment at the end of your 
worldly life is substantial. Finally, you are told that, after having made your 
choice, you will forget everything that you have been told. Assume that 
you have no idea whatsoever of what your post-natal circumstances will be. 
What should you do?" 
The odds of a favorable judgment after a worldly life are probably not in 
your favor. While I would very much like to believe that we will all even-
tually find our way to God, this is not a common view among Christians. 
Indeed, when I ask students to estimate the percentage of people in the 
world who are likely to go to heaven, the most common response ranges 
from 10 to 15%.'9 The vast majority of us, on this view, have the unending 
torments of damnation ahead of us. 
But the probability of a favorable judgment does not matter as long as it 
is less than 1. The smallest chance of an unfavorable judgment multiplied 
by the infinite cost attached to that judgment results in an infinite expected 
cost. No matter how good your worldly life might be, the expected benefit 
is finite. Thus, the expected value of choosing a worldly life is infinitely 
negative. Since the expected value of choosing premature death is infinitely 
positive, the only rational thing to do from the standpoint of self-interest is 
to choose premature death.,o21 
The blatantly self-interested character of the argument will undoubtedly 
appear counterintuitive and even repugnant to many readers. But a good 
part of religious motivation is rooted in self-interested desires for meaning, 
spiritual communion, peace of mind, and immortality; and this is a com-
mon theme among Christian thinkers. At the foundation of Kierkegaard's 
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strong fideism, for example, is the characterization of Christianity's import 
entirely in terms of self-interest. In distinguishing between what he calls 
the objective and subjective problems, Kierkegaard writes: 
The objective problem is: Is Christianity true? The subjective prob-
lem is: What is the individual's relationship to Christianity? Quite 
simply, how may I, Johannes Climacus, participate in the happiness 
promised by Christianity" (413)?22 
On Kierkegaard's view, then, what should really matter to the Christian is 
how to achieve the happiness associated with salvation and not whether 
Christian doctrine is objectively true. And in this connection it is worth 
noting that, while we may tend to resist such claims, we do not shy away 
from them when we proselytize: appeals to unbelievers typically make ref-
erence to the consequences of sin to well being.23 
It is, of course, understandable why we do not like to acknowledge the 
role of self-interest in religious motivation. Any appeal to self-interest in 
religious motivation seems to diminish the sincerity of religious faith. The 
idea, for example, that Mother Theresa was motivated in all she did ulti-
mately by a desire for salvation would rightly change our judgments about 
her exemplary character. For insofar as this is true, all that she did to allevi-
ate suffering in the world would have been motivated by a selfish desire to 
secure her own advantage. 
To say that self-interest forms an important part of religious motivation, 
however, is not to say that it exhausts such motivation. Nor is it to say that 
it reduces all religious sentiment to some sort of calculating attempt to max-
imize one's well being over the long term - any more than recognizing that 
self-interested motivation plays a role in romantic love reduces all romantic 
sentiment to such self-serving calculations. Even so, it is hard to deny that 
self-interest is an inescapable part of what we are both in faith and in the 
world.',! But, in any event, it should be clear that, from the standpoint of 
Christian ethics, a self-interested concern with our own salvation is a per-
fectly acceptable reason for seeking a relationship with God. Accordingly, 
and notwithstanding the strong temptation to think otherwise, there is 
nothing ethically problematic in thinking that there is a sense in which, 
from the standpoint of fetal self-interest, premature death is a blessing. 
What this means, then, is that if the Protection Thesis is taken as the stan-
dard that distinguishes sins that should be legally prohibited from sins that 
should be legally permitted, then abortion is a sin that should be legally per-
mitted. Since harm, in the relevant sense, must be considered from the 
standpoint of the typical victim of an act and since the expected value to the 
fetus of being aborted is infinite, it seems to follow that abortion, though 
sinful, should be legally permitted. If this is correct, then we have con-
structed a coherent pro-choice position entirely out of materials that are 
available to sincere Christians. 
At this point, one might be tempted to object that this analysis implies 
women ought to do their fetuses a favor and have abortions, but nothing of 
this sort follows. Tt is important to remember that this line of argument 
begins by conceding the sinful character of abortion; the conclusion is tl1.at 
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abortion, though always morally wrong, should be legally permitted. And 
the sinful nature of abortion provides a strong self-interested motive for a 
woman not to have an abortion. No matter how much benefit may accrue 
to the fetus, it does not mitigate the fact that committing an offense against 
God can never, all things considered, be in a person's sel£-interest.25 
Further, the sinful character of abortion provides a conclusive moral 
motive not to have an abortion. No matter how much benefit may accrue 
to the fetus and how benign the mother's motive in having an abortion, 
abortion remains a sin against God.'" For this reason, the balance of moral 
and self-interested reasons necessarily operates against having an abortion. 
And, as far as most choice advocates are concerned, this is as it should 
be. The vast majority of choice advocates concede the moral undesirability 
of abortion: abortion is always a morally objectionable outcome that 
should be discouraged. This, of course, is a judgment that such persons 
share with choice opponents. What the choice advocate denies is that the 
moral undesirability of abortion rises to the level of something that should 
be legally prohibited by the state. On the standard choice position, the 
fetus is not a person and hence does not have any right to life that could be 
infringed by an abortion. Thus, while choice opponents often seem not to 
realize this, the conviction that abortion is immoral is an important compo-
nent of the standard defense of abortion rights. And that concession is also 
an important component of the abortion position described here. 
V. Objections and Replies 
A. Abortion and the Offense Principle 
The first objection is a comparatively minor one. One might argue that a 
law prohibiting abortion can be justified by the Offense Principle. On this 
line of reasoning, allowing abortion will cause profound offense to oppo-
nents of abortion rights. For such persons, the very knowledge that abor-
tions are being performed in the community is sufficient to cause precisely 
the sort of mental discomfort that the Offense Principle is intended to pre-
vent. 111us, the argument concludes, if the Protection Thesis is true (i.e., that 
the Offense and Harm Principles exhaust the substantive limits of legitimate 
lawmaking authority), it follows that abortion should be legally prohibited. 
The problem with this objection is that it misconstrues the scope of the 
Offense Principle as justifying the legal restriction of any conduct causing 
in third parties one of the disagreeable states that constitutes being offend-
ed. But, as proponents understand it, the scope of the Offense Principle is 
limited to protecting against offense that results from behaviors that are 
public in the sense of being reasonably observable by others. Thus, for 
example, the Offense Principle would justify prohibiting public nudity on 
the ground it would likely cause offense to others, but it would not justify 
prohibiting nudity in a hotel room or in one's home no matter how much 
offense such behavior might cause to others. The Offense Principle is a 
standard that governs public behavior and not private behavior. 
Here it is worth remembering that the point of the Offense Principle, like 
the Harm Principle, is to define substantive constraints on democratic law-
making authority. To construe the Offense Principle as reaching every 
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behavior, regardless of whether it is public or private, is inconsistent with 
this intent. For if enough people are moved by mental distress of some sort 
to vote to prohibit some purely private behavior (such as nudity in any 
other room than a bathroom), then the Offense Principle would justify 
restricting that behavior. But this seems simply to leave it up to the democ-
ratic majority to decide what behaviors should be prohibited and permitted; 
for, as a practical matter, the occurrence of behaviors a person wants pro-
hibited usually cause her significant mental distress. Accordingly, this con-
struction seems to imply that there are no content-based limits whatsoever 
on democratic lawmaking - and is thus inconsistent with the substantive 
intuitions that motivate the Offense Principle.27 
B. Might Abortion Result in the Loss of Souls? 
The second objection seeks to identify a harm caused by abortion that justi-
fies protective measures under the Harm Principle. This objection begins 
with the observation that we cannot know at exactly what point in the 
pregnancy the fetus acquires a soul and hence becomes a person.2S If 
ensoulment takes place later on in the pregnancy, then it is possible to have 
an abortion prior to ensoulment. The worry here is that if the fetus is 
aborted prior to ensoulment and the creation of the soul occurs at the 
moment of ensoulment, then the abortion prevents the creation of the soul 
that would have inhabited the fetus. Thus, a pre-ensoulment abortion 
actually harms the would-be person by keeping its soul from being creat-
ed. Since we cannot know exactly when abortions can be performed with-
out causing such harms, all abortions should be legally prohibited.24 
This intriguing objection reverses a popular strategy employed by oppo-
nents of abortion rights. Like the objection above, this strategy begins with 
the claim that we are not in a position to know exactly when during a preg-
nancy personhood begins. Since, on this line of reasoning, we cannot 
know when personhood begins and since post-personhood abortions are 
murder, we should prohibit all abortions to preclude the possibility of 
murdering unborn persons. But whereas this line of reasoning attempts to 
prevent a harm that would result if an abortion is performed after ensoul-
ment, the ingenious objection described above attempts to prevent a harm 
that might result if an abortion is performed before ensoulment. 
There is a straightforward response to this objection. Assuming that a 
pre-ensoulment abortion would prevent a soul from coming into existence, 
no harm can result because there is clearly nothing to serve as the locus of 
harm. It is conceptually impossible to harm a soul that does not exist. 
While I do not think the point needs defense here, it should be noted that 
the contrary assumption has a number of absurd moral implications. It 
implies, for example, that a couple that decides against having children 
wrongs the souls that would have existed if the couple had attempted to 
conceive?' Moreover, it implies that a person who decides to remain celi-
bate for spiritual reasons wrongs the souls that would have existed had he 
or she decided not to remain celibate. If these consequences do not pro-
vide a conclusive refutation of this line of criticism, they certainly provide 
reasonable grounds for someone who wishes to defend a pro-choice view 
to reject the criticism. 
184 Faith and Philosophy 
C. Third-Party Hanns 
One might argue that even if abortion does not cause harm to the fetus, it 
does cause harm to third parties.3l On this line of reasoning, abortions fre-
quently result in profound emotional distress to the mother that often has 
disastrous effects on marriages and families. 32 Accordingly, if the 
Protection Thesis is true, then a legal restriction of abortion is justified as a 
means of preventing these harmful effects. 
There are a number of responses to this objection. Assuming these con-
tested claims about the psychological consequences of abortion are correct, 
they do not entail that abortion should be prohibited under the Harm 
Principle. To begin with, it is not enough to justify a legal prohibition that 
abortion causes some psychological harm. Forcing an unwilling mother to 
carry a pregnancy to term also causes considerable psychological harm -
and that is why there is an issue here to begin with. What would have to 
be shown to justify a restriction of abortion under the Harm Principle is 
that the psychological harm caused to mothers by allowing abortion is 
greater than the psychological harm caused to mothers by prohibiting abor-
tion.~~ All things considered, it is reasonable at this point in time to think 
that allowing abortion is, as far as the Harm Principle is concerned, the 
lesser of the two evils. 
The more serious problem, however, is that the Harm Principle does not 
operate to prevent harms that people do to themselves. As Mill forcefully 
puts it: 
His own good, either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant. 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be 
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in 
the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even right. There are 
good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or 
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or 
visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the 
conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to 
produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of any-
one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns oth-
ers. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, 
of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign (OL 13). 
Accordingly, the harm that the mother causes to herself, no matter how 
profound, would not be a legitimate ground for restricting her freedom 
under the Harm Principle. Paternalistic reasons, on this view, can never 
justify restricting a person's freedom. 
One might respond that the harm caused to fathers by abortion would justi-
fy restricting abortion under the Harm Principle. This argument suffers 
from the same defect as the last. To justify restricting abortion under the 
Harm Principle, it would have to be shown that the psychological harm 
caused to fathers by allowing abortion is greater than the psychological 
harm caused to fathers by prohibiting abortion. As should be obvious, 
unwilling fathers suffer a great deal of psychological distress from having to 
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bear responsibility for lU1we1come children. But it is worth noting that even 
if this can be shown (an unlikely prospect, I think), it would justify, at most, a 
law requiring the consent of both mother and father as a precondition for 
allowing an abortion. It would not justify a complete prohibition on abor-
tion because, as we noted above, the Harm Principle does not justify protect-
ing people from harmful risks that they vollU1tarily and knowingly assume. 
D. Original Sin and Fetal Innocence 
A fourth objection attempts a different strategy for showing that abortion 
results in harm to the fetus. On this line of argument, all persons are 
stained by original sin and hence cannot be saved without the sacrament of 
baptism. The Catholic Encyclopedia describes this doctrine as follows: 
Theologians distinguish a twofold necessity, which they call a neces-
sity of means (medii) and a necessity of precept (prcecepti). The first 
(medii) indicates a thing to be so necessary that, if lacking (though 
inculpably), salvation can not be attained; the second (prcecepti) is had 
when a thing is indeed so necessary that it may not be omitted vollU1-
tarily without sin; yet, ignorance of the precept or inability to fulfill it, 
excuses one from its observance. Baptism is held to be necessary 
both necessitate medii and prcecepti.... Christ makes no exception to 
this law and it is therefore general in its application, embracing both 
adults and infants. It is consequently not merely a necessity of pre-
cept but also a necessity of means.34 
It follows, according to this doctrine, that "infants who ... depart this life 
without baptism, be it of water, or blood, or desire, are perpetually exclud-
ed from the vision of God."35 No injustice occurs here because "[o]riginal 
sin deprived the human race of an unearned right to heaven."'" 
Like the preceding line of objection, this one concedes for the sake of 
argument that the Harm Principle defines the limits of legitimate lawmak-
ing authority, but denies that it operates in support of legalizing abortion. 
Since, according to this argument, fetuses that die without baptism are 
eternally excluded from the vision of God, they sustain a profolU1d injury.37 
Whether "perpetual exclusion from the vision of God" involves the tor-
ments of hell or the deprivation caused by separation from God, it involves 
an injury that is infinite because eternal in duration. Thus, contra my argu-
ment, the Harm Principle implies that abortion should be legally prohibit-
ed to protect fetuses from such injury. 
Many Christians, of course, reject the view that baptism is necessary for 
salvation. John Calvin, for example, wrote: 
Now, consequently, we must utterly reject the fiction of those who 
consign all the lU1baptized to eternal death .... Nowhere do we find 
that [the Lord] has ever condemned anyone as yet lU1baptized. I do 
not want anyone on this accolU1t to think of me as meaning that bap-
tism can be despised with impunity ... ; it merely suffices to prove that 
baptism is not so necessary that one from whom the capacity to obtain 
it has been taken away should straightaway be cOlU1ted as losUB 
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Accordingly, Calvin concludes that "infants are not barred from the 
Kingdom of Heaven just because they happen to depart the present life 
before they have been immersed in water."39 
There are a number of plausible theological and philosophical paths to 
this conclusion. One can, for example, reject the view of original sin 
grounding the claim that baptism is necessary for salvation. On this line of 
reasoning, the doctrine of original sin should not be construed as imputing 
guilt or culpability to persons. Rather it should be construed as an expla-
nation of why we are psychologically so susceptible to temptation. Since 
original sin, then, does not result in guilt or culpability on the part of the 
fetus, baptism is not necessary as a neutralizing response.'o Alternatively, 
one can reject the idea that third-party intervention is necessary for salva-
tion. On this view, while the church serves valuable instrumental purpos-
es (such as providing education), there is no need for the intervention of a 
church authority in the relationship between God and the believer. Finally, 
and more philosophically, one can reject the idea that a morally perfect 
God would penalize a person, such as a fetus, who is incapable of moral 
agency. But no matter how one reaches this conclusion, the result for our 
purposes is the same: assuming the fetus is a person, a fetus who dies pre-
maturely gets the infinite benefit of, so to speak, a free pass to heaven. 
While I find this latter view considerably more plausible than the view 
that baptism is necessary for salvation, there is no need to defend this point 
here. As will be recalled, my point here is merely to show how a pro-
choice position can be constructed, even under the assumption that the 
feius is a person, out of materials available to a Christian. To the extent 
that there is nothing in the core of Christian doctrine that entails that inno-
cents who die without the grace of baptism are thereby excluded from the 
vision of God, it is open to a sincere Christian to deny that doctrineY 
E. The Infanticide Objection 
The most serious objection to my argument is that it would also justify a 
law permitting infanticide. As I have argued, permitting abortion is con-
sistent with the Harm Principle because premature death infinitely benefits 
the fetus by providing a free pass to heaven; as will be recalled, fetuses are 
saved in virtue of their innocence. But exactly the same sort of argument 
can be made with respect to infants. Since infants are no more capable of 
sin than fetuses, it follows, according to this line of analysis, that premature 
death also infinitely benefits an infant by providing her with a free pass to 
heaven. Thus, it would seem to follow that if permitting abortion is consis-
tent with the Harm Principle, then so is permitting infanticide. 
There are a couple of ways to respond to this worry. First, one can sim-
ply hold that infanticide should be legally permitted at least within a peri-
od in which one can be certain that the infant lacks the sorts of cognitive 
abilities that would render her culpable and hence at risk for eternal 
damnation. 42 On this view, since the Harm and Offense Principles exhaust 
the limits of legitimate lawmaking authority and since infanticide does not 
result in harm to the infant, it follows it that would be illegitimate for a 
state to prohibit infanticide - no matter how profoundly sinful it might be. 
I think that even the most radically liberal Christian should adamantly 
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refuse to bite this bullet. While it is worth emphasizing that conservative 
and liberal Christians can comfortably accept many of the premises in my 
argument, the implication that infanticide should be legally permitted 
would rightly strike the vast majority of Christians as an obvious reductio of 
one of the premises in the argument. TI1US, this sort of analysis cannot serve 
as a viable foundation for a Christian pro-choice position unless we can 
show that it does not entail that infanticide should be legally permitted. 
To this end, one might attempt to distinguish infanticide from abortion 
in the following way. Whereas abortion necessarily implicates a mother's 
interests in her health and reproductive privacy, infanticide does not. Thus, 
while abortion rights are necessary to enable a woman to realize these 
interests in the context of an ongoing pregnancy, infanticide rights do not 
uniquely conduce to the realization of any legitimate interests a mother 
may have. Whatever legitimate interests, if any, a mother may have in not 
parenting her infant can be realized by putting the child up for adoption. 
This important difference, the argument concludes, justifies treating infan-
ticide differently from abortion. 
For my purposes, the problem with this analysis is that it abandons the 
approach that I have adopted here. In particular, it abandons the thesis 
that the Harm and Offense Principles exhaust the substantive limits of 
democratic lawmaking authority. Regardless of what maternal interests 
are implicated by abortion and infanticide cases, it nonetheless remains 
true that premature death results in an infinite benefit to a moral innocent 
- and should hence be allowed if the only relevant principles are the Harm 
and Offense Principles. To make out this case, one would have to supple-
ment these principles with another standard that distinguishes legitimate 
from illegitimate maternal interests and limits the application of the Harm 
Principle to cases implicating the former." 
A more promising response focuses on the harmful effects of allowing 
infanticide." On this line of reasoning, societal tolerance for the killing of 
even newborn infants would have the effect of diminishing the respect that 
we have for human life in general and hence would be likely to increase 
rates of violent crime. Thus, allowing infanticide even in limited circum-
stances would have psychological effects that are likely to result in an 
increase of violence against people who are morally culpable and hence are 
at risk of eternal damnation. 
The reason for this is that the physical similarities between infants and 
older persons playa profound psychological role in forming our ethical 
judgments with respect to the treatment of both. As Jane English explains 
this important connection: 
Our psychological constitution makes it the case that for our ethical 
theory to work, it must prohibit certain treatment of non-persons 
which are significantly person-like. If our moral rules allowed peo-
ple to treat person-like non-persons in ways we do not want people 
to be treated, this would undermine the system of sympathies and 
attitudes that makes the ethical system work."' 
The idea here is a natural one: our ethical judgments about and behavior 
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towards non-infants are shaped in part by our ethical judgments about 
infants because of the conspicuous physical similarities between the two. 
Thus, to the extent that we legally permit the killing of infants, we are mak-
ing more likely the killing of older persons who are subject to the risk of 
eternal damnation. Accordingly, a law prohibiting infanticide is justified 
under the Protection Thesis as a means of preventing this great harm. 
At this point, the choice opponent is likely to object that this sort of rea-
soning applies equally to abortions. It is clear, for example, that a nearly 
nine-month-old fetus bears a conspicuous physical similarity to a newborn 
infant and hence to children and adults. Indeed, English concedes this very 
point: "A fetus one week before birth is so much like a newborn baby in our 
psychological space that we cannot allow any cavalier treatment of the for-
mer while expecting full sympathy and nutritive support for the latter" (ACP 
241).46 Accordingly, the choice opponent argues that if the physical similari-
ties between infants and older persons justify restricting infanticide under 
the Protection Thesis, then the physical similarities between older fetuses 
and infants justify restricting late-term abortions under the Protection Thesis. 
As it turns out, this line of pro-life argument has the effect of making the 
liberal position I am defending here more rather than less reasonable. It 
would be an embarrassment for the argument I have described if it 
allowed third-trimester abortions; for most choice advocates, Christian and 
non-Christian alike, support abortion rights only during the early stages of 
pregnancy. Indeed, the idea that abortions should be legally permitted up 
to the day of delivery is, on my view, profoundly objectionable. Thus, like-
minded liberal Christians would, quite frankly, be relieved to concede that 
this line of argument provides a strong harm-based reason for a legal ban 
on both infanticide and third-trimester abortions. 
But it is important to note that such an argument will not support a ban 
on early-term abortions w1der the Protection Thesis. As English persua-
sively puts the point: 
Remember, however, that in the early weeks after conception a fetus 
is very much unlike a person. It is hard to develop these feelings for 
a set of genes which doesn't yet have a head, hands, beating heart, 
response to touch or the ability to move by itself. Thus it seems to me 
that the alleged "slippery slope" between conception and birth is not 
so very slippery. In the early stages of pregnancy, abortion can hard-
ly be compared to murder for psychological reasons, but in the latest 
stages it is psychologically akin to murder (ACP 241-242). 
While the issue of where to draw the line is a difficult one, it seems clear that 
the line cannot plausibly be drawn in the first trimester. Thus, a liberal-
minded Christian can coherently take a pro-choice position with respect to 
abortions during the first trimester and during the beginning of the second 
trimester. 
VI. Conclusions 
In this essay, I have attempted to show how a pro-choice position can be 
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constructed out of materials that are available in good faith to sincere 
Christians. I have argued that if the death of someone incapable of culpa-
bility results in a free pass to heaven, the premature death of a fetus results 
in no harm to the fetus. Thus, if the Protection Thesis is true, then abortion 
can legitimately be permitted - even on the strong assumption that the 
fetus is a person. 
Now it is one thing to say that a position is coherent and another thing 
to say that it can sensibly be adopted. While I think the position elaborated 
here is coherent and consistent with the core of Christian doctrine, I am not 
sure I would characterize this as the most sensible way to take a pro-choice 
position. The reader may be heartened to know that, while I find this line 
of reasoning quite interesting, I am also made extremely uncomfortable by 
it. Though it is hard for me to pinpoint exactly what is bothering me about 
the argument (since I find all of the premises extremely plausible)/7 my 
emotional response leads me away from it as a front-line defense of abor-
tion rights. 
Nevertheless, I think these considerations do have a sensible place in a 
pro-choice position. Many Christians adopt a pro-choice position on exact-
ly the kinds of argument that ground the pro-choice views of non-
Christians. Some Christians take the view that the fetus is not a person 
until later on in the pregnancys; others take the view that considerations of 
reproductive autonomy operate in favor of permitting abortion!" I happen 
to think these views are, in the relevant sense of the term, sensible posi-
tions that can (and should) be taken by conscientious Christians. 
By my lights, the most sensible role for the argument described here is 
as something that augments these legitimate grounds for supporting abor-
tion rights. One can argue that even if it turns out, for example, that the 
fetus is a person at the moment of conception,so there is no harm that can 
possibly result from an abortion to the fetus. Likewise, the claim that the 
fetus is not harmed by abortion entails that the effects of abortion on fetus-
es cannot be used as a counterweight to considerations of reproductive 
autonomy. Accordingly, the potential harm to the fetus is nullified as a 
ground for objecting to these pro-choice arguments. 
Of course, these maneuvers are not likely to placate strongly pro-life 
Christians or make a pro-choice position more comfortable. But there is 
nothing particularly special in this regard about my approach. Christian 
and non-Christian choice advocates frequently experience a good deal of 
discomfort with their positions; the moral significance of the fetus weighs 
heavily in the balance of reasons - as it should. Such discomfort, then, 
comes with the territory. And there is little that can be said to change the 
fact that choice opponents frequently find pro-choice views profoundly 
offensive (though one would like to see a more deeply felt appreciation on 
the part of choice opponents for the moral significance of reproductive 
autonomy). Like gay rights, the death penalty, euthanasia, and any other 
interesting moral issue, the issue of abortion gives rise to views that will 
always provoke discomfort of some kind. It is not an objection to the view 
I defend here that it cannot alleviate those inevitable pains and frictions." 
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NOTES 
1. Of course, there is little in the way of Biblical evidence on the issue one 
way or another. . 
2. James S. Spiegel argues that a Christian can be morally pro-life and 
politically pro-choice only to the extent that "(a) [she] holds the [morally pro-
life] view to be justifiable by theological reasons alone and (b) [she] believes the 
theological evidence to be only minimally sufficient to justify the [morally pro-
life view]." See James S. Spiegel, "Can a Christian be Coherently Morally Pro-
Life and Politically Pro-Choice?" Christian Scholar's Review, vol. 30, no. 1 (Fall 
2000), 107-115, 115. The idea is that such a combination of positions is coherent 
only in the face of certain kinds of epistemic doubt about the morality of abor-
tion. Though Spiegel is not a specific target of this paper, the arguments I 
make, if sound, show his view is incorrect. 
3. Presumably, a person may consent to the state's enacting restrictions on 
her own freedom. 
4. For an outstanding discussion of the various issues implicated by the 
anarchist critique of authority, see Scott Shapiro, U Authority," forthcoming in 
Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
5. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 12. 
Hereinafter referred to as OL. 
6. Joel Feinberg, Offense to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1985), l. 
7. Feinberg, Offense to Others, 1. 
8. The Harm Principle, then, should be understood as asserting only that 
it is permissible for the state to prohibit behaviors that cause harm to others. 
Thus, this construction does not entail Mill's view that the prevention of harm 
is the only legitimate grOlmd for restricting freedom. 
9. Abelard's Ethics, translated by J. Ramsay McCallum (Merrick, NY: 
Richwood Publishing Co., 1976); excerpted in Andrew B. Schoedinger, 
Readings in Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 121-
142,132. All references are to the Schoedinger volume. 
10. Abelard's Ethics, 132. 
11. Peter Singer takes this view, arguing that the capacity for sentience is a 
precondition for having interests. See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New 
York: Random House, 1975). 
12. See Kenneth E. Goodpaster, "On Being Morally Considerable," Journal 
of Philosophy, vol. 75, no. 6 (June 1978),308-325. 
13. Since my approach is not secularist, it does not depend on either of 
these assumptions. 
14. One can see a related difficulty emerging in Peter Singer's views on the 
moral standing of animals. Singer, as is well known, rejects the idea that it is 
the capacity for abstract reasoning that gives rise to moral standing. On 
Singer's view, any being that is vulnerable to harm because it is capable of suf-
fering has a claim to have its interests considered in the deliberations of moral 
agents. Since non-human animals are capable of suffering, it follows that non-
human animals are entitled to what he calls equal consideration: "If a being 
suffers, there can be no justification for refusing to take that suffering into con-
sideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality 
requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering - in so far 
as rough comparisons can be made - of any other being." Singer, Animal 
Liberation,9. Accordingly, Singer wants to conclude that eating meat, at least in 
cultures where legumes, grains, vegetables and fruits are plentiful, is wrong 
because it serves no more worthy interest than culinary pleasure. 
ABORTION AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF FETAL INNOCENCE 191 
The problem, however, is that the principle of equal consideration seems to 
rule out eating only those animals that have been raised and slaughtered under 
painful conditions. If animals can be raised and slaughtered in a way that caus-
es them no pain (something that cannot be ruled out a priori), then it seems 
that, on Singer's analysis, it would be permissible to eat them. Insofar as the 
notion of harm is conceptually linked to the capacity for suffering, it appears to 
follow that there is nothing inherently objectionable with killing since killing 
need not inflict suffering on the victim. 
15. There are problems with this model. The idea that one's ultimate fate 
might depend on factors over which one lacks direct volitional control seems 
difficult to reconcile with God's moral perfection. For example, eternal damna-
tion seems to be a morally inappropriate fate for someone who is killed five 
minutes before he would have accepted the Christian creed. For a discussion 
of these issues, see Linda Zagzebski, "Religious Luck," Faith and Philosophy, 
vol. 11, no. 3 (July 1994), 397-413; and Scott A. Davison, "Salvific Luck," 
Tnternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 45, no. 2 (April 1999), 129-137. 
In any event, the view described above is common enough among Christians 
and remains viable in the absence of a compelling alternative. 
16. Abelard's Ethics, 137. 
17. Don Marquis, "An Argument that Abortion is Wrong," in John Arthur 
(ed.), Morality and Moral Controversies, 5th Ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1999), 187-195, 190. 
18. Assume that God gives you moral permission to make the choice. 
19. Assuming religious pluralism is false, simply eliminating non-
Christians results in a sizeable reduction in the number of people eligible for 
heaven. 
20. Expected value, expected cost, and expected benefit are defined as fol-
lows: 
Expected benefit (A) = (probability that A occurs)(benefit if A occurs) 
Expected cost (A) = (probability that A does not occur)(cost if A does not 
occur) 
Expected value (A) = Expected benefit (A) +Expected cost (A) 
It is worth noting that there are limits to the usefulness of expected value 
analysis when we are dealing with costs and benefits that accrue over an eter-
nal interval. For the expected value of a reasonably pleasant eternal afterlife 
would be equal to the expected value of an infinitely pleasant eternal afterlife. 
Unfortunately, the arithmetic of infinite numbers does not distinguish among 
the various afterlives. 
This, of course, is not surprising. Ordinary arithmetical operations behave 
strangely over infinite numbers. Thus, for example, if you add one countably 
infinite set to another, you wind up with a set that is countably infinite. 
Indeed, taking the generalized union of a cOlmtably infinite number of count-
ably infinite sets results in a countably infinite set. For a number of interesting 
illustrations, see William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith (Crossway Publishers, 
1974). 
This should not be thought to invalidate the general idea for a couple of rea-
sons. First, one could simply represent the relevant costs and benefits by a 
very large finite number and get the same results - and no finite number 
would be too large to overvalue the costs of helL Second, since we are not try-
ing to compare one infinite option with another, the relevant problems do not 
arise. In any event, I think that, from the standpoint of rational self-interest the 
conclusion of the argument is obvious. I am grateful to Phil Goggans for point-
ing out this issue to me. 
21. Indeed, it is worth noting that if you are given a choice between taking 
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your chances with a life that carries a substantial risk of eternal damnation and 
simply opting for non-existence, the rational thing to do seems to be to choose 
non-existence. Relative to the choice above, of course, this would be an especial-
ly unhappy decision to make. But it strikes me as the rational one to make if you 
are in the position of a fetus with no information about what sort of parents, 
character, abilities, and socia-economic circumstances you are likely to have. 
22. Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, edited and translated by E.H. 
Hong and H.V. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983). 
23. Indeed, the Bible is itself quite explicit in appealing to self-interest: "For 
God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whoever 
believes in Him should not perish but have everlasting life" (John 3:16). 
24. I think it is fair to say that the attitude of believers towards their faith 
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